Interest Rate Hikes Cannot Save the Australian Dollar: The Exchange Rate Paradox of a ‘Stagflationary Rate Hike’

Interest Rate Hikes Cannot Save the Australian Dollar: The Exchange Rate Paradox of a ‘Stagflationary Rate Hike’

AdenXie

Automatically translated. Read the Chinese original.

Introduction: This is our second article on the Australian dollar. On 21 October 2026, we‘Australian Interest Rate Hikes and the AUD/CNY Exchange Rate: The RBA’s 2026 Tightening Cycle and AUD/CNY Scenario Analysis’A question was raised here: will this round of interest rate hikes by the RBA be enough to prop up the Australian dollar? Half a month later, the market provided the answer—No. And it is not because the rate rises were not aggressive enough; on the contrary, it is precisely because they were too aggressive, too late and too half-hearted.This article aims to address three points: why the Australian dollar fell in isolation on 5 November; just how significant a role iron ore played in this downturn; and whether the currency is likely to continue its downward trend.

I. Let us first look at a set of unusual figures

On 3 November 2026, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) raised the cash rate by 25 basis points to 4.85%—This is The highest level since 2008, and also marks the start of this tightening cycleThe fifth interest rate rise。

According to textbook theory, an interest rate rise should be beneficial for the domestic currency. What actually happened was:

Point in time AUD/USD Notes
3 November (RBA decision day) 0.6968 Down 0.4 per cent during trading; shares fell immediately following the interest rate hike
4 November (following the US election) A slight recovery The US dollar fell across the board, with the Australian dollar benefiting as a result
5 November (the day of the US stock market crash) -1.0% The biggest single-day fall since 10–15
6 November (US Non-Farm Payrolls) Continue to fall The US dollar surged, whilst the Australian dollar came under pressure
8 November (at the time of writing) Approximately 0.6867 The 0.6895 support level has been breached; the next support level is 0.6865

Within five days, following a 25-basis-point interest rate rise, the Australian dollar fell from 0.6968 to 0.6867—a drop of around 1.5 per cent—which effectively wiped out all the interest rate differential advantage that this rise should theoretically have provided, and even left a shortfall.

This is not a policy failure. It is the market pricing in something else:Stagflation。

5 November: Evidence of a Solo Decline and the Weighting of the Four Factors
5 November: Evidence of a Solo Decline and the Weighting of the Four Factors

Figure 1On the left is the performance of the three major currencies against the US dollar on 5 November—the Australian dollar fell by 1.0 per cent, the euro remained flat, and the pound fell by just 0.1 per cent; On the right is this publication’s assessment of the relative contributions of four factors to the current downturn (risk sentiment approximately 40 per cent, the US dollar and interest rate differentials approximately 35 per cent, the RBA’s positive news having run its course approximately 15 per cent, and the terms of trade for commodities approximately 10 per cent). These weightings are based on analytical judgement and do not represent official estimates.

II. 5 November: Why did the Australian dollar fall on its own?

To understand the nature of this downturn, one need only look at a single point of comparison.

On 5 November 2026, US shares plummeted due to a sell-off in the AI sector (the Nasdaq fell by 5.52 per cent), and a highly asymmetrical pattern emerged in the foreign exchange market that day:

Currency pairs 5 November: Changes
AUD/USD -1.0%
EUR/USD Unchanged (0.0%)
GBP/USD -0.1%

The significance of these figures lies in the fact that:If the dollar were simply to ‘strengthen’ on that day, there would be no reason for the euro and the pound to remain unchanged. If the US dollar were to strengthen across the board, the three major currency pairs should have fallen in the same direction and by similar margins. In reality, the euro remained completely unchanged, the pound barely moved, and only the Australian dollar fell by a full one per cent.

It is not the US dollar longs that are being sold, but the Australian dollar’s own risk profile.

The Australian dollar plays a unique role in the global foreign exchange market: it isHigh-beta proxies for risk appetite. When global investors are willing to take on risk, the Australian dollar is one of the preferred assets for long positions (high-yielding, commodity-linked and highly liquid); when risk appetite wanes, it is also among the first to be liquidated. On 5 November, the collapse of the US AI sector triggered a deleveraging of global risk assets, and the Australian dollar, as a high-beta asset, was mechanically sold off—This has no direct connection with what is happening to the Australian economy itself.

This is important because it determines the focus of subsequent observations:If this downturn is primarily driven by risk beta, then its recovery will also depend mainly on global risk sentiment rather than domestic policy in Australia. 11–17: NVIDIA’s earnings report may have a greater impact on the Australian dollar than the RBA meeting in December.

III. The interest rate rise on 3 November: why is it a negative asset?

Judging by the wording of the statement, the RBA’s decision on 3 November was a typical“Dovish rate rise”—One might even say it was an“Stagflationary interest rate rises”。

The interest rate rise itself has long been 100 per cent priced in.

The ASX’s RBA Rate Tracker shows that, prior to the announcement of the decision, the market had already priced in a 25-basis-point rate rise of 100%. In other words,The moment the interest rate hike was announced, all the positive news had already been priced in, leaving no ‘surprises’ to trade on.

The pricing following the meeting speaks volumes: the market believes that the December meetingto hold one’s groundThe probability is as high as 95-100%. In other words, the market believes this marks the end of this cycle, with no further interest rate rises to be expected.

The wording of the statement is more important than the interest rate rise itself

A few sentences in the original text of the RBA statement (mr-26-30) encapsulate the full awkwardness of this interest rate rise:

Key Points of the Statement Meaning of the original text The role of exchange rates
Vote: 6 to 3 Three votes in favour of maintaining the rate at 4.60 per cent; there was a clear divergence of opinion Bearish — indicates a lack of resolve to raise interest rates
The economy is slowing down Weakening growth momentum bearish
House prices have fallen significantly Interest rate rises have already had a tangible impact on household balance sheets bearish
The unemployment rate has risen, and the increase is expected to exceed the August forecast The labour market is deteriorating bearish
Inflation remained high for most of 2027,End of 2027It has only just returned to the upper end of the 2–3 per cent target range About later than previously forecastthree quarters; moreover, some of the expected indicators have risen Headwinds – inflation is proving more stubborn, whilst growth is weaker
Conflict in the Middle East is driving up fuel and commodity prices Imported inflation Neutral to bearish

If you read this table as a whole, it boils down to one sentence:With economic growth already slowing, house prices falling significantly and unemployment rising, the RBA has been forced to continue raising interest rates, even though there is no sign that inflation will ease any time soon. This is the standard definition of stagflation. And stagflation is nothing but bad news for a currency—it robs the country of both its growth prospects and its real interest rate advantage.

An easily overlooked detail

The statement also noted that:“Investment in AI is driving a rapid rise in the prices of technology-related commodities.”

This statement is worth noting in its own right. It implies that part of this round of inflation isStructural—It is driven neither by overheating demand nor by a wage spiral, but rather by rising prices for capital goods resulting from AI infrastructure investment. This type of inflation is insensitive to interest rate rises:It is difficult to persuade data centres to buy fewer servers simply by raising interest rates. This also goes some way towards explaining why the RBA’s inflation forecast has been pushed back to the end of 2027.

IV. The actual weights of the four factors

Breaking down this round of falls, we believe it is the result of four interrelated factors. The weightings are based on this publication’s assessment of the day’s asset performance (labelled asAnalysis(unofficial estimates):

factors Weights for this round On the basis of
① Risk sentiment beta Approximately 40 per cent 5 November: The Australian dollar fell by 1.0 per cent, whilst the euro remained flat and the pound fell by 0.1 per cent—a textbook example of pure risk beta
② US dollar / interest rate differential expectations Approximately 35 per cent Following the release of the non-farm payrolls figure of +165,000 (against an expected 65,000) on 6 November, the probability of a rate rise at the December FOMC meeting jumped from 67 per cent to 80 per cent, and the US dollar surged.
③ The positive impact of the RBA’s policy has run its course Approximately 15 per cent A rate rise has been 100 per cent priced in; a hold in December is priced in at 95–100 per cent; the vote is 6:3; and the statement acknowledges the economic slowdown.
④ Goods / Terms of trade Approximately 10 per cent (this month) Iron ore prices have fallen, but the RBA describes the decline as ‘slight’; this is a slow-moving factor rather than a trigger for this month

Regarding points ② and ③: a single forecast curve links the three markets

Point ② is worth elaborating on, as it forms the link between this article and the previous three.

The US non-farm payrolls data released on 6 November pushed the probability of a rate rise in December from 67 per cent to 80 per cent.Pricing along the same expected return curve across three markets simultaneously: In the US stock market, it has reduced the valuation tolerance for AI capital expenditure (see‘Pricing Three Times a Week: The Plunge, the Non-Farm Payrolls, and the Link to Nvidia’); in the US bond market, it pushed up long-end yields; in the foreign exchange market, it drove up the US dollar and weighed on all non-US currencies—with the Australian dollar, due to its risk beta, suffering the sharpest fall.

So half the reason for this downturn in the Australian dollar lies outside Australia. This is why an interest rate rise by the RBA alone cannot save it.

Two interpretations, which are parallel rather than mutually exclusive

There is a clear divergence of views in the market regarding the factors driving the Australian dollar, so both interpretations must be presented:

Interpretation 1 (SocGen, 3 November 2026):“AUD/USD is essentially a bet on industrial metals, rather than a bet on the RBA/Fed interest rate differential.” The bank noted that the 200-day moving average at 0.7050/0.7080 has shifted from support to resistance; meanwhile, short positions in the Australian dollar account for 39.5%, marking the most bearish level since February 2025.

Alternative Reading (NAB, Report dated 3 July 2026): The main driver of the Australian dollar is The RBA’s cycle of interest rate cuts—The bank expects the RBA to cut interest rates by 75 basis points from the second quarter of 2027, corresponding to the AUD/USD target for the end of 2027 0.67, and believes that prices may fall in the second half of the year 0.65。

These two interpretations are not contradictory; they refer to two different time scales: The short term (1–3 months) is driven by interest rate differentials and risk sentiment, whilst the medium term (12 months or more) is driven by commodity terms of trade and the RBA’s policy cycle. SocGen describes the long-term nature of the Australian dollar, whilst NAB describes its path over the coming year. To pit the two against each other is to conflate different time horizons.

V. Iron ore: The market is on a downward trend, but this was not the trigger for the current downturn

This is the first question this article aims to address:Is this recent fall in the Australian dollar linked to the fact that iron ore prices are failing to rise?

The answer is:It is relevant, but it is not the cause of this fall. Iron ore explains ‘why the Australian dollar cannot recover’, but it does not explain ‘why it has fallen so sharply over the past five days’.

Let’s start by looking at the figures: how significant is iron ore within Australia’s exports?

Indicators Value Calibre
Revenue from iron ore exports (Financial Year 2025–26) A$123 billion (A$123B) Official ‘Quarterly Report on Resources and Energy’, September 2026
Export revenue (forecast for 2026–27) A$107 billion (A$107B) Ibid., down 13 per cent year-on-year
Export revenue (forecast for 2030–31) A$79 billion (A$79B) Ibid., down 36 per cent compared with 2025–26
as a proportion of total revenue from the export of resources and energy More than 25 per cent Ibid.
Dependence on exports to China Approximately 80–85 per cent S&P Global (830.9 million tonnes of the 977.2 million tonnes in 2025 were shipped to China); 80–85 per cent according to IEEFA figures

Iron ore is Australia’s largest single export commodity, accounting for more than a quarter of the country’s export revenue from natural resources, with over 80 per cent of it sold to a single buyer. This concentration implies that iron ore prices and Sino-Australian relations are two variables that cannot be ignored in the long-term valuation of the Australian dollar.

Historical correlation: high, but not causal

AUD/USD and iron ore pricesThe historical correlation coefficient is approximately 0.76(MacroMicro calibre).

0.76 is quite a high figure, butA correlation does not imply causation.0.76 reflects the fact that when global industrial demand (particularly in China) strengthens, iron ore prices rise, Australia’s terms of trade improve and the Australian dollar appreciates—These three things are driven by the same cause, rather than by one another. Interpreting 0.76 as ‘when iron ore prices rise, the Australian dollar must rise’ is to mistake a common cause for a transmission mechanism.

Three pieces of evidence pointing to a slump in the iron ore market
Three pieces of evidence pointing to a slump in the iron ore market

Figure 2Three pieces of evidence pointing to a ‘sliding floor’ for iron ore. Top: Australian iron ore export revenue is projected to fall from A$123 billion in the 2025–26 financial year to A$107 billion in 2026–27, and A$79 billion forecast for 2030–31 (based on the official ‘Resources and Energy Quarterly’ report, September 2026); bottom left: the forecast for the 61 per cent Fe FOB price has fallen from US$83/t to US$72/t; bottom right: Simandou’s shipment ramp-up in 2026 is outpacing the guidance provided at the start of the year (Q3 exports of 8.9 million tonnes, with the full-year total likely to reach approximately 28 million tonnes).

Looking at the price: it’s falling, but the decline hasn’t been steep this month

Calibre Value Source
Average price of 62% Fe in September US$98.3/t(Month-on-month +0.7%) REQ 2026-09
2 November Spot Approximately US$91.2 per tonne(Approximately year-on-year -10.8%) TradingEconomics
Forecast of the average quarterly price for December 2026 US$95/t Westpac Commodities Forecast October 2026
Forecast average price for the quarter ending December 2027 US$83/t Ibid.
61% Fe FOB Medium-Term Forecast 2026–27 US$83/t → 2030–31 US$72/t REQ 2026-09

The most crucial piece of evidence comes from the RBA itself. In its Monetary Policy Statement of November 2026, the RBA stated the following regarding iron ore: prices“A slight fall”(slightly lower), and“Price pressures remain moderate, as supplies are still plentiful”(price pressures remain subdued as supply remains abundant)。

If iron ore were the main cause of this round of declines in the Australian dollar, the RBA would not have used the term ‘slight decline’ in its statement, nor would it have emphasised that price pressures were moderate. The central bank’s assessment of the price of the country’s largest export commodity is closer to the truth than any second-hand commentary.

The real problem lies in the structure, not in this month

The pressure on the Australian dollar from iron ore isStructural, slow, three lines of inquiry:

  1. Demand in China has peaked. China’s crude steel output peaked in 2020 and has since entered a period of structural decline (according to IEEFA); the Australian Government’s own forecasts also indicate that iron ore exportsQuantityIt will peak and then decline over the next two years.
  2. New supply is gradually increasing, and at a faster rate than expected. Total exports from the Simandou project in Guinea in the third quarter of 2026 8.9 million metric tonnes(Baowu 6.55 million metric tonnes + Simfer 2.16 million metric tonnes); if shipments continue at the same rate in October, full-year exports will amount to approximately 28 million tonnes—Whereas the guidance at the start of the year was 15–20 million metric tonnes (S&P Global, January 2026). Macquarie’s commentary was blunt:“Simandou single-handedly sustained the volume of maritime shipments.” The shipping market is expected to face a surplus of approximately in 2026 16 million tonnes。
  3. The balance of bargaining power is shifting. China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG) has adopted a tougher stance in its negotiations with BHP and Fortescue by leveraging alternative supplies from Simandou (according to IEEFA).

Added to this is China’s official manufacturing PMI for October 49.3, non-manufacturing sector 49.7, both falling below the boom-bust line (Reuters, 31 October 2026) — there are no signs of any improvement on the demand side.

This journal’s assessment

Iron ore is ‘hitting rock bottom’, not ‘the trigger for this downturn’.

To break it down:

  • It explains why the Australian dollar’s pivot point is shifting downwards. Export revenue is forecast to fall by around 30 per cent over five years (A$123 billion → A$79 billion, 2025–26 to 2030–31), downward revisions to price forecasts, Chinese demand peaking, and a surge in new supply—these four factors have determined that the Australian dollar’s long-term equilibrium exchange rate is lower than it was three years ago.
  • It does not account for the -1.0 per cent on 5 November. On that day, iron ore prices did not plummet, nor did the euro fall. It was the Australian dollar’s risk profile that took a hit.
  • The implications of the operation differ. If the move is driven by commodity factors, the buying opportunity should be sought when iron ore prices stabilise; if it is driven by risk beta, the buying opportunity should be sought when global risk sentiment recovers.The timelines for these two events are completely different—The former is on a quarterly basis, whilst the latter is on a weekly basis.

VI. Will the market continue to fall?

This is the second question, and also the most difficult one to answer. Let me begin by setting out a methodological premise:The wide divergence in institutional forecasts is, in itself, the clearest evidence of the highest level of uncertainty.

Analysts’ target price: from 0.66 to 0.72

Organisation AUD/USD Target Point in time Logic Calibre
NAB 0.67(H2 or a potential dip to 0.65) End of 2027 The RBA will cut interest rates by 75 basis points from Q2 2027 3 July 2026 Report, part of the July forecast
CBA 0.66 March 2027 Slightly bearish Second-hand account
Westpac 0.72 December 2026 Support from commodity prices and interest rate differentials Second-hand account
Retail Consensus (24 firms) 0.7126 2026 Q4 87% are optimistic The methodology is geared towards the retail sector,Low weighting
SocGen No price predictions — The 200-day moving average at 0.7050–0.7080 acts as resistance —

The current price is approximately 0.6867. CBA’s target of 0.66 lies approximately 3.9 per cent below this level, whilst Westpac’s target of 0.72 lies approximately 4.9 per cent above it; the spread between the two is approximately 8.7 per cent. In other words, even amongst professional institutions, the divergence in views on where the Australian dollar will stand at the end of the same year is nearly 9 percentage points—and the time points covered by these five forecasts are not the same (December 2026, March 2027, end of 2027); strictly speaking, they are not even fully comparable. Any assertion that ‘the Australian dollar is bound to fall below a certain level’ goes beyond what is supported by currently available market information.

Technical Perspective: Distinguishing between institutional and retail perspectives

  • Institutional definition: 0.6895 – The key support level has been breached; the next level is 0.6865(Convera 5 November 2026); above 0.7050-0.7080 At the 200-day moving average resistance level (SocGen).
  • Retail Technical Analysis Criteria(TradingView individual analyst,For information only; not to be relied upon): The support zone of 0.68565–0.68807 has been breached; the next support levels are 0.66047–0.66647, followed by 0.64517.

Holding a position is a double-edged sword: Australian dollar short positions account for of open interest 39.5%, marking the most bearish sentiment since February 2025 (as reported by SocGen). Extreme short positions could either fuel a rebound (short squeeze) or provide momentum for a further decline (as trend traders increase their positions) —As the direction is uncertain, this should only be interpreted as a signal that ‘volatility may increase’ and should not be used on its own to determine the direction of the market.

Three scenarios (probabilities are based on this journal’s assessment; each scenario is subject to specific trigger conditions)

Comparison of Current Price with Analysts’ Target Prices and Three Scenarios for the Future Market
Comparison of Current Price with Analysts’ Target Prices and Three Scenarios for the Future Market

Figure 3The chart above shows a comparison of the current AUD/USD price with the target prices set by four institutions (current price: 0.6867; NAB: 0.67, CBA: 0.66, Westpac: 0.72, retail consensus: 0.7126; the respective dates and methodologies are indicated in the chart); Below are three scenarios for the future market outlook, along with their corresponding key levels and trigger conditions.

Scenario Probability Key positions Trigger conditions
Continue to fall 40% Break below 0.6865 → 0.67 → 0.66–0.665 8–9 December: FOMC raises interest rates as expected, with a hawkish dot plot; iron ore falls below US$85/t; China’s November data continues to weaken; US equities test their lows for a second time
Consolidating at low levels to form a bottom 45% Fluctuating within the 0.68–0.70 range Interest rate hike implemented but pause signalled; iron ore at US$90–95/t; China rolls out stimulus measures; short covering
Recovery rebound 15% Recover to 0.6895 → Target 0.7050–0.7080 No interest rate rise in December (due to weaker data); the RBA to raise rates once more in December; strong stimulus in China; the US dollar weakens due to fiscal and political risks

Why is ‘bottoming out’ the base-case scenario? This is because there are three bearish factors already partially priced in on the downside (a December rate rise, weakness in iron ore and Chinese demand), whilst on the upside there is one possibility that has yet to be priced in (a short squeeze driven by extreme short positions); At the same time, the RBA is nearing the end of its rate-hiking cycle (the market is pricing in a 95–100 per cent probability of no change in December), which meansThe point at which the bad news has run its course is drawing near。

However, there is one asymmetry to bear in mind: If the FOMC does indeed raise interest rates in December and the dot plot takes a hawkish tone, the Australian dollar’s decline will be faster and deeper than in the ‘bottom-forming’ scenario—because the US-Australia interest rate differential will worsen in two ways simultaneously (US rate hikes and a pause in Australian rate rises). This is why the probability of a ‘continued decline’ is set at 40 per cent, rather than a lower figure.

VII. Conversion to Renminbi

All of the above relate to AUD/USD. Readers holding Renminbi should also refer to AUD/CNY.

Let’s first look at the actual quotes from the last few days (the source must be specified):

Calibre Value Date
China Merchants Bank Mid-Market Rate 4.65456 → 4.56635 11-05 → 11-06
Wise hits a low 4.5824 11-07

There is a price difference of 1–2 fen between different platforms(Spot, mid-market and bank rates are calculated differently); if readers see a figure such as 4.55 during trading hours, this represents a normal fluctuation in spot quotes and is not an anomaly.

Mechanical conversions (including explicit assumptions): AUD/CNY = AUD/USD × USD/CNY. Assuming that USD/CNY ≈ 6.68:

AUD/USD Corresponding to AUD/CNY (USD/CNY = 6.68)
0.686 (current) Approx. 4.58
0.66 (CBA target) Approx. 4.41
0.65 (in the event of a NAB dip) Approx. 4.34

This conversion is based on one key assumption: that the exchange rate between the renminbi and the US dollar remains unchanged. If the renminbi also weakens during the same period, the fall in the Australian dollar against the renminbi will be cushioned; if the renminbi strengthens, the fall will be exacerbated.Please do not treat the table above as a standalone forecast for AUD/CNY… it simply applies the AUD/USD scenario to a fixed USD/CNY assumption.

VIII. What to look out for over the next four to six weeks

Observation items Time Why is it important?
December FOMC 12-08/09 Will the interest rate hike materialise (currently priced in at around 80 per cent) + the dot plot; this is the key driver for the US dollar
December RBA meeting December Whether to halt trading (current price remains unchanged at 95–100 per cent) + whether the wording of the statement has shifted
China’s November figures mid-December PMI, crude steel output, property investment; direct indicators of iron ore demand
Iron ore prices Continuous Can 62% Fe hold the US$90/t level?; Stockpiles at Chinese ports
Shipping from Simandou Continuous Whether the 2027 shipment guidance will be revised upwards again; the pace at which the expected surplus materialises
Short positions in the Australian dollar Every week Is 39.5 per cent extreme enough to trigger a short squeeze?
Risk sentiment in the US stock market From 11–17 NVIDIA’s earnings report is the next trigger for this round of risk beta… the impact on the Australian dollar may be greater than that of the RBA’s December meeting

One final point is worth emphasising: as demonstrated in Section 2 of this paper, approximately 40 per cent of this downturn is attributable to risk beta.It is therefore highly likely that any short-term recovery in the Australian dollar will not stem from Canberra, but rather from a rebound in global risk appetite. NVIDIA’s earnings report on 11–17 may have a greater impact on AUD/USD than the RBA meeting in December.

IX. Continuity with the preceding text

X. Explanation of Data Gaps and Definitions

  1. The year-to-date high for AUD/USD of “around 0.71” is based on the team’s baseline; this article has not independently verified the specific date or price level.
  2. No intraday prices have been obtained since 8 November, The figure of 0.6867 cited in this article is the morning quote for 11 August.
  3. There is a mix of four different measurement standards for iron ore prices: Spot vs Futures, 62% Fe vs 61% Fe, CFR vs FOB. This article has been annotated accordingly; readers must retain the same terminology when citing it.
  4. Both the CBA’s 0.66 and Westpac’s 0.72 are second-hand figures(According to aggregated media reports), the original reports from the two banks could not be obtained.
  5. 39.5 per cent of positions are short on the Australian dollar, according to SocGen, the original position report (CFTC / ASX) was not readily comprehensible.
  6. Retail technical levels (0.66047–0.66647, 0.64517) are provided by individual analysts on TradingView and should not be cited as institutional forecasts.
  7. China’s November figures have not yet been released, The relevant trigger conditions in the scenario table are subject to verification.
  8. NAB’s target of 0.67 is taken from the report dated 3 July 2026, which was part of the July forecast; market conditions have since changed.

Main Sources of Information and Verification Index

The three-scenario probabilities regarding future market trends presented in this article (further decline: 40 per cent; consolidation at low levels to form a bottom: 45 per cent; recovery and rebound: 15 per cent), the weighting of the four factors, and the interpretation of various ‘key levels’ are all conditional inferences made by this publication based on publicly available information as at 8 November 2026. They do not constitute a forecast of exchange rate movements, nor do they constitute any investment or foreign exchange advice. All probabilities are accompanied by specific trigger conditions; should these conditions change, the probabilities should be adjusted accordingly. The target prices cited from various institutions in this article represent third-party views and do not reflect the position of this publication.

Cover image:Sydney Opera House — Photo by Adrian Rubiales on Pexels (licensed for free commercial use)

  • Title: Interest Rate Hikes Cannot Save the Australian Dollar: The Exchange Rate Paradox of a ‘Stagflationary Rate Hike’
  • Author: AdenXie
  • Created at: 2026-11-08 18:00:00
  • Updated at: 2026-11-08 18:00:00
  • Link: https://blog.adenxie.com.cn/2026/11/08/2026-11-08-rba-stagflationary-hike-aud-paradox/
  • License: Unless otherwise noted, original text and images by AdenXie: CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; original code: GPL-3.0. Third-party material retains its original rights and licenses. Scope & exceptions.
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Interest Rate Hikes Cannot Save the Australian Dollar: The Exchange Rate Paradox of a ‘Stagflationary Rate Hike’